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ENVIRONMENTAL UPDATES
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S.Ct. 365 (2008).
The United States' Navy regularly conducts training exercises -
utilizing mid-frequency active ("MFA") sonar - off the southern coast of
California. A priority of these exercises is to certify strike groups, which
consist of an aircraft carrier or amphibious assault ship, and accompanying
groups of surface ships, submarines, and aircraft, for deployment;
specifically, these exercises require the use of MFA sonar to detect
modern diesel-electric submarines, which are employed by adversaries of
the United States. The waters off the coast of southern California are ideal
for these training exercises because of their proximity to land, air, and sea
bases.
However, the waters used by the Navy for its training operations
are home to at least 37 species of marine mammals. While it is agreed that
MFA sonar affects marine mammals, the severity of such effects are
disputed. The Navy claims that in the course of 40 years of training
exercises involving MFA sonar, there have been no documented instances
of sonar-related injury to marine mammals. The Navy qualifies this
observation by recognizing that, at most, MFA sonar may cause marine
mammals to experience temporary hearing loss or brief disruptions in the
behavioral patterns. However, others contest that MFA sonar, which can
be as loud as 2,000 jet engines, result in far more deleterious consequences
than the Navy asserts, including permanent hearing loss, decompression
sickness, and major behavioral disruptions.
These perceived dangers led a group of petitioners, including the
National Resources Defense Council, to sue the Navy for not preparing an
environmental impact statement prior to conducting a round of training
exercises in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
The District court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction
and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and, upon review, reversed and vacated the preliminary injunction.
The Supreme Court found the lower courts' standard for issuing a
preliminary injunction - the possibility of irreparable harm - to be too
lenient; instead, the Court insisted that a showing that irreparable injury is
likely without an injunction is necessary. However, even with a showing
of irreparable injury, the Court stressed that competing claims of injury
must be weighed with particular regard to the public consequences of
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granting an injunction. In addition, a court must grant deference to the
professional judgment of military authorities concerning military interests.
Upon specific concerns of Navy officers that a preliminary
injunction would reduce the effectiveness of the Navy's training exercises,
the Court found that the District Court did not sufficiently balance equities
and public interest. Furthermore, the District Court abused its discretion
by prohibiting the Navy from using MFA sonar within 2,200 years of a
marine mammal because the court failed to recognize the burdens of such
shutdowns. In addition, the District Court abused its discretion by
requiring that the Navy power down its MFA sonar by six decibels in the
event of surface ducting, a phenomenon where little sound penetrates the
surface of the water. The unpredictability and infrequent occurrence of
surface ducting underscores the importance for the Navy to train under
this condition. For the foregoing reasons, the Supreme Court concluded
that the consequences of a preliminary injunction in this case were too dire
to be permitted; instead, the Court suggested other remedial judicial
remedies, including declaratory relief or an injunction that is tailored to




Ackison, et al. v. Anchor Packing Comp., et al., 2008 WL 4601676 (Ohio
2008).
Linda Ackison filed suit in May 2004 on behalf of her deceased
husband, Danny Ackison, alleging that Anchor Packing Company, her
husband's former employer, along with several other defendants had
exposed Mr. Ackison to asbestos, and that this exposure caused her
husband's illness and ultimately his death. The only claim at issue in this
case is a claim for nonmalignant asbestosis.
In response to finding that the "asbestos personal injury litigation
system was unfair and inefficient" and that it "impos[ed] a severe burden
on litigants and taxpayers alike," the Ohio legislature revised the state
laws that governed asbestos legislation in September 2004. This
legislation enacted House Bill 292 ("H.B. 292") which established
threshold requirements for certain asbestos related claims including
nonmalignant claims. According to the revised legislation a plaintiff must
provide "qualifying medical evidence of physical impairment", and this
qualifying medical evidence must be "supported by the written opinion of
a competent medical authority stating that the claimant's exposure to
asbestos was a substantial contributing factor to his medical condition",
encompassed in R.C. 2307.92. Under R.C. 2307.93(C) if the threshold is
not met the suit is dismissed, but the plaintiff is free to refile the claim
once the threshold is met. Further, under R.C. 2307.93(A)(2) and (3) the
legislature applied the new legislation to any pending cases, whether or
not the case was filed prior to the effective date of the new legislation.
The trial court determined that no substantive rights were violated
by the retroactive application of the revised asbestos legislation and,
therefore, that the legislation did not violate the Ohio Constitution. It
subsequently dismissed Ms. Ackison's claims since she had not filed the
documentation required by the revised legislation. Ms. Ackison appealed
this decision and the court of appeals, contradicting three twelfth district
court of appeals cases, found the application of the revised legislation was
unconstitutional, because it divested a vested substantive right granted by
the statute that was in place at the time of her filing.
The original defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court of
Ohio for the determination of whether the retroactive application of the
revised legislation was unconstitutional. The Court noted that while the
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Ohio Constitution expressly denied the general assembly any power to
enact retroactive laws, statutes that merely apply retroactively are different
from those that do so unconstitutionally. In order to determine whether the
retroactive application was unconstitutional the Court used a two-part test,
the first part which considered whether the statute was expressly
retroactive. If it was the court then had to determine whether that
retroactive application was remedial, which would be constitutional, or
substantive, which would be unconstitutional. The Court noted that the
legislature expressly applied the revisions to any pending cases without
regard to when the claim was filed, and therefore the legislation was
expressly retroactive.
Having decided that the revised asbestos laws applied retroactively
the Court then had to decide whether the retroactive application was
remedial, affecting the remedy or procedure for the cause of action, or
substantive, affecting a substantive right. The Court previously held two of
the statutes at issue, R.C. 2307.92 and 2307.93, to be procedural in nature,
and affirmed this in the instant case. Despite this conclusion Ms. Ackison
continued to challenge the constitutionality as applied to the instant case,
and as a result the Court noted she bore the burden of proof.
Ms. Ackison's chief argument was that prior to the enactment of
H.B. 292 damages for asbestos-related conditions were recoverable if
there was simply a change in the lungs due to the exposure, without any
showing of impairment or disease. The Court noted that "pleural
thickening" would be considered one such change. According to precedent
the cause of action vests when the plaintiff is "informed by competent
medical authority that he ha[d] been injured," and therefore the Court
needed to determine whether pleural thickening constituted such an injury.
The Court noted that two lower court precedents had found in the
affirmative; however, the Ohio Supreme Court had not yet decided the
issue. The Court found the reasoning of both lower court precedents was
based on a misinterpretation of the Restatement Second of Torts when
they applied a broad definition of harm that was meant for the intentional
tort of battery. As a result the Court determined that recovery for merely
showing pleural thickening was not settled common law, and therefore
Ms. Ackison had not satisfied her burden of proving that retroactive




Wong v. Bush, 542 F.3d 732 (9t Cir. 2008)
Wong v. Bush arose out of an August 2007 protest that was broken
up by the U.S. Coast Guard after it impeded the docking of the Hawaii
Superferry in a Kauai, Hawaii harbor. Hundreds of people, concerned with
the possible environmental impact of the ferry's operation, swam or surfed
into the harbor and blocked its path for several hours. After the Coast
Guard broke up the demonstration, protestors sued in district court seeking
a preliminary injunction and alleging that use of a "security zone" to
justify dispersal of the protest violated free speech rights and that the
Coast Guard should have considered the environmental impact of the
security zone and of the Superferry before acting. The district court held
that the Coast Guard did not exceed its authority by breaking up the
protest and that it did not have to consider the environmental impact of its
actions. The protestors appealed and the 9 th Circuit affirmed.
The Coast Guard broke up the protest under the authority of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and related regulations, which
govern its authority to create security zones to safeguard U.S. waters.
Security zones can be established to safeguard American waters against
destruction, sabotage, subversive acts or accidents. The plaintiffs first
argued that the use of a security zone in the harbor violated First
Amendment free speech rights. The Coast Guard argued that because the
security zone in question was no longer in place, the issue was moot, and
that the First Amendment rights of protestors did not extend to their
present conduct.
The court held that the issue was not moot because it was capable
of repetition. The protestors had indicated their willingness to again block
the Superferry if it attempted to reenter the harbor, and the Coast Guard
had indicated that it would reestablish the security zone if this occurred.
This was enough to establish a possibility of repetition. Next, the court
considered the protestors' argument that the use of the security zone
violated their First Amendment rights. The court held that the security
zone was a reasonable, content-neutral restriction on speech and that it
was therefore not barred by the First Amendment.
The court looked next to the protestors' contention that the Coast
Guard failed to consider the secondary environmental effects of the
security zone and of the ferry's operation. Because it found that the
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agency's action was neither arbitrary nor capricious, the court held that it
was excluded from the normal requirement under NEPA that a "no-action"
alternative be considered before taking action. The 9th Circuit also rejected
the plaintiffs' argument that the Coast Guard had to consider the
environmental impact of the ferry before taking action. The scope of
NEPA review is limited to activities authorized by federal action. The





The Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs. v. Sullivan, No. 06-70T, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 96212 (D. R.I. Nov. 25, 2008).
The United States District Court in Rhode Island recently dealt
another body blow to Detroit's struggling automakers. General Motors
and DaimlerChrysler ("automakers")-along with two automobile
manufacturers' associations and several Rhode Island automobile
dealers-sought declaratory judgment against a Rhode Island state
regulation which set emissions standards for new automobiles. In an
effort to prevent higher emissions standards, automakers claimed Rhode
Island's state regulation was preempted by federal law. In response,
Sullivan (the relevant state Rhode Island director) argued that the doctrine
of issue preclusion barred automakers from claiming preemption because
preemption had already been decided in cases brought in United States
District Courts in California and Vermont.
Automakers claimed Rhode Island's state regulation was
preempted by the Clean Air Act ("CAA") and Energy Policy and
Conservation Act ("EPCA"). The CAA sets federal emissions standards
for new automobiles and expressly preempts any differing state emissions
standards, except California. If California obtains a waiver under the
CAA, it can establish a more strict emissions standard, which other states
may then adopt in identical form. The EPCA sets federal fuel economy
standards for new automobiles. Like the CAA, the EPCA expressly
preempts state regulation of fuel economy standards. However, unlike the
CAA, the EPCA does not contain any waivers allowing states to establish
a different fuel economy standard.
In 2005, California sought a waiver under the CAA to establish a
stricter state emissions standard. Before California was granted a waiver,
Rhode Island and several other states adopted California's stricter
emissions standard for their own states, realizing they could not enforce
their stricter standard unless California was granted the waiver.
California's waiver request was ultimately denied and California's appeal
of the denial is currently pending in the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit.
Before seeking declaratory judgment in Rhode Island, automakers
had brought suit in United States District Courts in California and
Vermont arguing the same preemption issues under the CAA and ECPA.
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The Vermont court reached a decision first and rejected automakers'
preemption arguments. Automakers appealed the Vermont decision,
which is currently pending before the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals.
Subsequent to the Vermont court's decision, the California court granted
summary judgment against automakers, likewise rejecting automakers'
CAA and EPCA preemption arguments.
On the basis of the Vermont and California courts' decisions, the
United States District Court in Rhode Island dismissed automakers' action
because automakers were collaterally estopped (or issue precluded) from
arguing preemption. After providing a thorough explanation for why the
doctrine of issue preclusion applied to automakers' arguments, the Rhode
Island court determined there was little benefit in allowing the automakers
another opportunity to challenge state regulations regarding emissions
standards. If automakers were allowed to reargue preemption issues, it
would lead to vexatious and costly litigation, potential inconsistent
decisions, and wasted judicial resources. Therefore, the Rhode Island
court dismissed automakers' declaratory judgment action.
The concluding point is that the Rhode Island court's ruling has
little current impact on automakers because California has not yet been
granted a waiver for stricter emissions standards. Until California is
granted a waiver, no state can establish higher emissions standards than
federal law provides. However, automakers are concerned because they
suspect President-elect Barack Obama's administration-unlike that of
President George Bush's-will grant California a waiver to promulgate
stricter emissions standards regulation. The upshot is that time will tell





Sycamore Indus. Park Assoc. v. Ericsson, Inc., 2008 WL 4613874 (7th
Cir. 2008)
In 1984, Ericsson, Inc. agreed to sell its 28-acre industrial property
to Sycamore Industrial Park Associates, a company organized by former
Ericsson employees in order to turn the specific property into an industrial
park. The property was heated by boilers. These boilers were large units
attached to the floor of the buildings that held them. The large units were
connected to other buildings through a pipe system, most of which ran
near the ceiling of the buildings and were connected to the building by
"metal fasteners." Before the transfer to Sycamore was complete,
Ericsson installed natural gas unit heaters to the entire facility and ceased
to use their old boiler-based heaters, but left the system in tact in the
facility and did not remove the boiler-based system when the sale to
Sycamore was complete. In 2004, Sycamore founded asbestos in the
insulation that covered the steam boiler system and its piping. Sycamore
sued Ericsson to compel it to do away with the asbestos. Sycamore
claimed that by suspending use of the boiler system, but not removing it
from the property violated Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). On January 9, 2008, the
district court granted Ericsson's motion for summary judgment. Sycamore
appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit stated in order for a plaintiff to establish
CERCLA liability, they must prove the site is a "facility" as defined by
CERCLA; the defendant is a responsible party; there has been a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance; and the plaintiff has incurred
costs because of the release of the hazardous material. The Seventh
Circuit held the second and third elements were at issue in this case.
The first CERCLA element at issue was whether Ericsson was the
responsible party. The court held in order for Sycamore to establish
Ericsson was the responsible party, it must establish that when Ericsson
owned the property in question "it discharged, deposited, injected,
dumped, spilled, or leaked a solid or hazardous waste or placed it into or
on any land or water." This came directly from the definitions of
responsible party and disposal in CERCLA. The court interpreted the
statute to mean that in order for Ericsson to be the responsible party,
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Sycamore must also establish that Ericsson disposed of the hazardous
material. The next issue the court considered was whether the asbestos-
infested boiler system was hazardous material. Again, the court looked to
the definition of "hazardous waste" under CERCLA, which read that
hazardous waste must be solid waste, which happens to also be defined by
CERCLA. However, the court assumed that asbestos is solid waste, but
held Ericsson's actions were not "disposal" because it did not place the
asbestos on or into any land or water so it would enter the environment, as
the CERCLA definition of disposal requires. However, Sycamore argued
that by selling the property that the asbestos was contained on constituted
disposal. However, the court followed precedent from their own circuit,
as well as the Ninth Circuit, to hold that simply selling property containing
hazardous material was not a disposal as required by CERCLA. The court
reasoned that there was no evidence showing that Ericsson simply sold the
property to dispose of the hazardous material, and therefore, could not be
held liable for the disposal of the asbestos as CERCLA requires.
In determining the second issue, whether there was a release or
threatened release of the hazardous substance, the court again turned to
definitions provided by CERCLA. The court looked to the statutory
definitions of both release and environment, and then held because there
was no emission into the environment, and instead the asbestos was
confined to the inside of the buildings, that there could be no "release" as
required by CERCLA. Therefore, Ericsson could not be held liable under
CERCLA.
Next, the court addressed Sycamore's RCRA claim. In order to
determine if Sycamore could establish a prima facie case for a RCRA
claim, the court looked straight to the definition of "disposal" under the
statute. The definition of disposal is the same under RCRA as it is under
CERCLA; therefore, the court again held that Sycamore could not prove
that the asbestos was placed on or in the outside environment, and was
instead contained inside buildings on the property. In addition, the court
held that the RCRA requires active involvement with the hazardous
material in question to determine liability and looked to other courts
interpretation of this requirement. The majority of other courts had held
that affirmative action, rather than a passive manner was required to place
liability with an entity. The court held there was no evidence that Ericsson
had any knowledge of the asbestos, let alone any affirmative action with
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the hazardous substance. Therefore, unable to find Ericsson liable under
either CERCLA or RCRA, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
summary judgment for Ericsson.
NICOLE HUTSON
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Sierra Club v. Franklin County Power of Illinois, LLC, Case No. 06-4045
The Sierra Club filed suit against Franklin County Power of
Illinois (Franklin) to enjoin the company from building a coal fired power
plant in southern Illinois. Because the power plant would emit a
significant amount of air pollution, Franklin was required to obtain a
"Prevention of Significant Deterioration" (PSD) permit from the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) (the agency designated by the
federal Environmental Protection Agency to issue such permits in Illinois)
Sierra Club alleged that Franklin's PSD permit expired because it did not
begin construction in an 18 month period required by the permit and that
the permit was invalid because Franklin discontinued construction for 18
months. The district court agreed with Sierra Club, granting summary
judgment and permanently enjoining Franklin from constructing the power
plant. Franklin appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh
Circuit, which affirmed the district court's ruling.
In August, 2000, Franklin applied to the IEPA for a permit to build
a 600 megawatt coal power plant (a major emitting facility) on land on
which it had a 99-year lease. Because the power plant would be a "major
emitting facility," Franklin was required to apply for a PSD permit. The
PSD contains emissions limitations established by the IEPA and
represents the "best available control technology" for pollution. The
agency issued the permit on July 3, 2001. The permit stipulated that if
construction of the boilers did not begin within 18 months of the issuance
of the permit or if construction discontinued for 18 months or more or if
construction was not completed within a reasonable time, the permit
would become invalid.
On December 2, 2002, Franklin entered an agreement with Black
& Veatch (B & V), an engineering and construction firm, to work together
to develop an engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) contract.
On December 18, Franklin contracted with Alberici Constructors, which
would excavate the work site. In January 2003, Alberici workers
delivered equipment and began excavating the site, but on February 14,
after a payment dispute, Alberici stopped working.
In July 2004, Franklin's landlord filled in the hole on the site after
Franklin missed a lease payment. In September 2004, Franklin signed a
new excavation contract and work began again later that month.
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In November, 2004, IEPA made a preliminary finding that
Franklin's permit had expired. Finally, in May, 2005, Sierra Club
commenced this suit.
In ruling for Sierra Club, the court first noted that since the permit
was issued on July 3, 2001, its "drop-dead date" was January 3, 2003.
Next, the Court examined 40 CFR 52.21 (r)(2), which states that a permit
will expire if construction doesn't "commence" within 18 months of the
permit's issuance or if construction is discontinued for 18 months or if
construction is .not completed within a reasonable time. 42 USC
7479(2)(A) defines "commence" as beginning "a continuous program of
physical on-site construction of the facility" or "enter[ing] into binding
agreements or contractual obligations, which cannot be canceled or
modified without substantial loss to the owner or operator, to undertake a
program of construction of the facility to be completed within a reasonable
time."
The court disagreed with Franklin's contention that it prevented the
permit from expiring by beginning a "a continuous program of actual
construction" that included "conducting engineering studies [and]
excavation work." The EPA, in 40 CFR 52.2 1.(b)(1 1) defines "begin
actual construction" as "initiation of physical on-site construction
activities on an emissions unit which are of a permanent nature." The
court acknowledged that beginning actual construction might be different
than beginning a continuous program of on-site construction as defined
under 42 USC 7479(2)(A)(i), but found that the company did not do any
construction work at all. The court observed that as of the "drop-dead
date," Franklin had not laid a foundation, building supports, underground
pipework, or permanent storage facilities. Also, in direct contravention to
the explicit requirements of the PSD, Franklin had not begun work on the
boilers before January 3. The only work performed was the hole dug by
Alberici, but this was not "continuous" work because it ended on February
14, 2003, and it wasn't "permanent" because Franklin's landlord later filled
in the hole.
The court further supported its conclusion by citing an EPA
memorandum, which stated that site clearing and excavation work
generally doesn't satisfy the commence construction requirements.
Finally, the court reasoned that even if Franklin had commenced
construction, the permit became invalid because construction lapsed for
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over 18 months. After Alberici discontinued work on February 14, 2003,
it did no more work and the site appeared to lay dormant for over 19
months until September 29, 2004, when a different company began
digging a hole. The 19 month lapse invalidated the PSD permit.
Next, Franklin argued that it "commenced construction" by signing
a "construction memorandum" with B & V, which required the two
companies to work together on an exclusive basis to draft and negotiate
the Engineering, Procurement, and Construction Contract. In order for the
construction memorandum to qualify as one that commences construction,
per 42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(A)(ii), it [could not] be canceled or modified
without substantial loss to the owner or operator" and would have to
"undertake a program of construction of the facility to be completed
within a reasonable time."
The court found that even if the construction memorandum
somehow commenced construction, the PSD permit had expired because
of the 19 month lapse. However, the construction memorandum did not
prevent the lapse from killing the permit. If the construction
memorandum trumped the lapse provision, construction could be delayed
indefinitely merely by entering a contract that commences construction.
However, the Court ruled that the construction memorandum was
not a contract. It was a preliminary step toward agreeing on a contract for
building the power plant. Indeed, the memorandum only required the two
companies to reach a construction agreement, not begin actual
construction. For example, the memorandum required the two companies
to work together in good faith to draft and negotiate the contract. The
memorandum further specified that upon termination of the memorandum,
the construction company would have no liability to perform any work. In
addition, the companies had not agreed on a price term. Further, the
construction company indicated it could not meet Franklin's target 32-
month completion time, instead settling on 45 months. However, the
construction company said that if Franklin found a company to complete
construction within 32 months and for a specified price, Franklin must
work with that company. All of these facts, the court ruled, indicated that
the memorandum was not a contract.
Finally, Franklin argued that "program of construction" should be
interpreted more broadly. The court cited EPA material stating that
"program" does not including planning and design of a unit. The court
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also cited EPA material stating that in order to comply with construction
commencement requirements, contractual obligations must be site-
specific. Site-specific activities include placement, assembly, or
installation of materials, equipment, or facilities comprising the ultimate
structure. Franklin and B & V, however, made no agreements for site-
specific construction. They had merely agreed to create a contract.
The court agreed with this outcome. The PSD requirements
prevent companies from sitting on permits for long periods of time. This
helps ensure that emitting facilities comply with modem emissions
regulations and don't use old technology. Interpreting "program of
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Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides v. E.P.A.. 544 F.3d
1043 (9th Cir. 2008).
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has the authority
to regulate the use of pesticides for agricultural purposes under two
statutes; the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA") and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA").
While FIFRA establishes the appropriate procedure for registering a
pesticide, FDCA allows EPA to establish the maximum allowable amount
of a pesticide that may remain in a commodity. In other words, FDCA
requires EPA to determine the level of pesticide residue that may remain
on the commodity without rendering the treated commodity unsafe for
human consumption.
In 1996, Congress amended FDCA and required EPA to assume
that pesticides posed a greater risk to infants and children. Specifically,
EPA had to apply a ten-fold factor to establish a safety margin that would
be ten times greater for infants and children. However, EPA could reduce
the safety factor if EPA had reliable data that a lower safety margin was
sufficient to protect infants and children.
In 2001 and 2002, EPA established seven tolerance levels for
pesticides which were to be used on vegetables, fruits, nuts and cereal
grains. EPA did not use the ten-fold safety factor in its determination of
the pesticides' tolerance levels. EPA established tolerance levels using a
four-fold factor for four of the pesticides and no increased safety margin
for three of the pesticides. The Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to
Pesticides and the Natural Resources Defense Council each petitioned for
review of EPA's final order establishing the pesticides' tolerance levels.
The petitioners argued that EPA did not have the necessary
"reliable data" that would allow EPA to reduce the safety margin in its
analysis of the pesticides' effect on infants and children. Specifically, the
petitioners argued that the EPA's computer models were unreliable
compared to actually taking samples of drinking water to determine the
amount of pesticide residue that makes it to the water supply. The
petitioners also argued that EPA's failure to wait for the results of certain
developmental neurotoxicity tests rendered EPA's data unreliable.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard under § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act and
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rejected the petitioners' arguments. In doing so, the court gave EPA wide
latitude on "questions of scientific judgment."
Despite rejecting the petitioner's first two arguments, the court
found one of the petitioners' administrative objections persuasive. The
petitioners' had previously argued that EPA had failed to justify its
decision to apply a 3x safety margin as opposed to a factor between three
and ten. For example, the petitioners wanted to know what made a 3x
safety margin more appropriate than a 4x safety margin. The court found
this argument to be persuasive and remanded the petition for review to
EPA so that it could issue an explanation for selecting a reduced safety
margin. The dissent agreed with the majority with the exception of the
majority's treatment of the petitioner's administrative objections. The
dissent noted that the petitioners did not seek review of EPA's action
based on its failure to provide an explanation for a reduced safety margin.
Instead, according to the dissent, the petitioner's relied on undermining the
reliability of EPA's data. As such, the dissent felt the majority was
relying on an objection not properly before the court.
R. CALEB COLBERT
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Upper Big Blue Natural Res. Dist. V. State Dep't of Natural Res.,
756 N.W.2d 145 (Neb. 2008).
The Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act
(hereinafter Act) grants the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources
(hereinafter DNR) authority to determine when any river basis in fully
appropriated. The DNR determined that the Upper Platte River Basin was
in fact fully appropriated in December of 2005, including a portion of the
Big Blue River Basin (hereinafter Big Blue) in that determination. On
April 21, 2006 DNR published its final determination, articulating the
inclusion of the small portion of Big Blue in the appropriation as due to a
hydrological connection between Upper Plate River Basin surface water
and Big Blue ground water.
Upper Big Blue Natural Resources District (District) challenged
DNR's determination, averring that DNR exceeded its scope of authority
by including the portion of Big Blue in its appropriation determination of
the Upper Platte River Basin and in enacting 475 Neb. Code, ch. 24 setting
forth regulations pertaining to appropriation determinations. After the
district court affirmed DNR's promulgation of 475 Neb. Code, ch. 24 and
the inclusion of Big Blue in its appropriation determination, the District
appealed again to the Supreme Court of Nebraska.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska looked to the DNR enabling
statute, finding that the Act permits DNR to "adopt and promulgate...
rules and regulations as are necessary" to discharge assigned duties,
including such regulations as are necessary to make determinations as to
river basin appropriation. 475 Neb. Code, ch. 24 was one such appropriate
regulation made pursuant to this grant of rulemaking authority.
Furthermore, the Court found that the Nebraska Legislature explicitly
required DNR to examine and consider hydrological connections between
basins geographically located in different districts under the Act.
Moreover, in the absence of any legislative limitations on DNR's
definition of hydrological connections, the Court found it entirely
appropriate that DNR promulgate 475 Neb. Code, ch. 24 in order to
establish standards to be applied in such determinations.
The Court held that DNR acted pursuant to the Act in enacting 475
Neb. Code, ch. 24, and that DNR's inclusion of a portion of Big Blue in its
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Fund for Animals v. Kempthorne, 538 F.3d 124 (2nd Cir. 2008).
Fund for Animals v. Kempthorne is a case brought in federal court
by the Fund for Animals and other animal advocacy groups against federal
agencies, including the Fish and Wildlife Service. The Fish and Wildlife
Service (hereinafter referred to as "FWS") promulgated a Depredation
Order against double-breasted cormorants, migratory birds. This Order
was issued after reports of the species' hindering commercial activities. It
authorized state fish and wildlife agencies, Native American tribes, and
State Directors of the Wildlife Services program to take (kill) a double-
crested cormorant if it depredates or is about to depredate fish, wildlife,
plants, and their habitats. The Plaintiffs claim that the Public Resource
Depredation order violates federal statutes and treaties. The court
considers three of the Plaintiffs' arguments: that the order violated the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), that the Order conflicts with United
States treaties with other countries, and that FWS acted arbitrarily and
capriciously when promulgating the Depredation Order.
The MBTA gives agencies discretion to create Depredation
Orders. Depredation Orders are generally formulated after evidence of a
species damaging other species or habitats is submitted. The order is only
issued on an emergency basis. It also must be specific when describing
the correct manner for taking species.
Plaintiffs argue that FWS's Depredation Order violates the MBTA
because the taking authorization is too unspecific and does not require
prior permission to take the birds. In general, agencies are not allowed to
delegate their responsibility to others because the agency may lose its
decision-making abilities and because the delegates may not share the
same goals and objectives as the agency. However, the court reasons that
the order is narrow and specific enough that it serves not as a delegating
function, but rather as a grant of permission to take the birds. Nowhere in
MBTA does it state that FWS has to give prior permission to take the
birds, but only that there should be specific directions for taking the birds.
Therefore, the court concludes that the Depredation order does not violate
MBTA.
Next, the Plaintiffs argue that FWS's failing to establish a close
season violates the Mexico Convention and thus violates the MBTA.
Plaintiffs stress that creating a close season is required for all migratory
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birds under the Mexico Convention. However, defendants argue that the
wording of the treaty does not require formulation of a close season for
game birds, and both parties agree that the cormorant is a game bird. The
court determines that both interpretations are reasonable, but that it must
defer to the agency interpretation. Therefore, the order does not violate
the treaty nor the MBTA.
Finally, the Plaintiffs argue that the FWS acted arbitrarily and
capriciously when formulating the depredation order because it allowed
too many killings of cormorants. Defendants argue that the order is
reasonable considering the restrictions placed on the killings and harm
caused by the birds. Defendants also argue that the method chosen for
regulating the birds is sensible. The court agrees with the defendants,
noting how the restrictions placed upon those taking the birds form a
correlation with the purpose of the Order: specifically, that the birds must
be about to commit or are committing depredations in order to be taken.
Finally, the court determines that the FWS's actions were reasonable after
considering the harm caused by the birds. Even though the Plaintiffs
argue that FWS should have considered other alternatives besides the
order, the court notes that the agency considered seven solutions before
deciding on the Depredation order. Thus, FWS reasonably considered
many alternatives to the Order. Lastly, the Plaintiffs argue that the action
violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) because it did not
examine the environmental impact of the order, nor did it allow the public
to comment upon the order. The court determines that since Depredation
Order was not site-specific, NEPA did not require an examination of the
order's environmental impact. The examination would have been wholly
speculative.
Since again, all of the Plaintiffs' arguments failed, the court
affirmed the district court's summary judgment.
ABBIE E. HESSE ROTHERMICH
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Lincoln-Dodge, Inc. v. Sullivan, 1:06-cv-00069-T-LDA (D.R.I. Nov. 25,
2008)
Several automobile manufacturers, automobile associations, and
automobile dealers ("Plaintiffs") sought declaratory relief against the
Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management ("RIDEM")
alleging that Air Pollution Control Regulation 37 ("Regulation 37") was
invalid. The plaintiffs initially filed two separate actions, but the actions
were consolidated. The basis of the Plaintiffs' claims was that the Clean
Air Act ("CAA") and the Energy Protection and Conservation Act
("EPCA") pre-empts Regulation 37. RIDEM filed a motion for judgment
on the pleadings through the theory of collateral estoppel. The Federal
District Court of Rhode Island granted RIDEM's motion as applied to the
manufacturers and associations, but denied the motion as applied to the
dealers.
Regulation 37, which is virtually identical to California's "CARB"
regulation, promulgates emission standards for new automobiles. The
CARB regulation and Regulation 37 require more stringent standards for
automobile emissions of greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrous oxide, and hydro fluorocarbons. The CAA requires the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to
establish regulations regarding the emission of air pollutants from
automobiles. It expressly pre-empts the adoption of different standards by
any state. However, it provides that California may adopt and enforce
more stringent standards if it obtains a waiver from the EPA. Further, once
California obtains a waiver, other states may adopt similar regulations.
The EPCA establishes Corporate Average Fuel Economy ("CAFE")
standards that require manufacturer's fleet of new vehicles' average
mileage to be at least 27.5 miles per gallon. Additionally, Congress
passed the Energy Independence and Security Act ("EISA") in December
2007 increasing the CAFE standards for models manufactured in 2011 and
after. Like the CAA, the EPCA, and the subsequent EISA, contain pre-
emption provisions disallowing states from adopting and enforcing
emission standards different from the Federal standards. Unlike the CAA,
however, the EPCA and the EISA, do not contain waiver provisions.
Pursuant to the CAA waiver provision, California applied for a waiver,
in regard to its CARB regulation, from the EPA. After California applied
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for the waiver, several states promulgated regulations virtually identical to
California's CARB regulation, including Rhode Island's Regulation 37.
Subsequently, the EPA denied California's waiver application.
California's petition for review of the denial is currently pending in the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. After the waiver denial, the
manufacturers and associations of the instant case, accompanied by
different dealers, initiated similar actions in California and Vermont.
These cases were decided against the manufacturers, associations, and
dealers and were heavily relied upon by the Rhode Island District Court.
The Vermont Case, Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v.
Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007), was decided first. The Green
Mountain Court held a regulation promulgated pursuant to a waiver
authorized by federal law would not be considered a state law subject to
EPCA pre-emption. Further, the Court held even if the regulation were
considered subject to EPCA pre-emption, it would not be pre-empted
because emission standards are not related to or conflict with mileage
requirements. Additionally, the Court held the CAA does not prohibit
adoption of regulation but only the enforcement of the regulation leaving
the claim moot, as the regulation could not be enforced until California
obtained the waiver.
Next, the California case, Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v.
Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007) was decided. The Court
entered summary judgment in favor of the Defendant. The Court's
reasoning was, because the undisputed facts established that at least partial
compliance could be achieved with only incidental impact upon fuel
economy standards, the regulation was not a de facto restriction on
automobile mileage and, therefore, not pre-empted by EPCA. Similar to
the Vermont Court, the California Court held the CAA claim as moot
because the CARB regulation was unenforceable until California received
the waiver and, as such, the mere adoption of the regulation does not lead
to pre-emption.
The Court in the instant case ruled on RIDEM's motion for judgment
on the pleadings. RIDEM based their motion upon the theory of issue
preclusion. It argued the manufacturers and associations were re-litigating
issues, which had already been adjudicated in both the Vermont and
California decisions. The manufacturers and associations argued the issues
presented are pure questions of law not precluded by collateral estoppel
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and the application of issue preclusion would freeze the development of
law with respect to important national issues. The Court found the
unmixed question of law argument less than compelling because, as
shown by the California and Vermont decisions, the issues raised are
mixed questions of law and fact. Further, the unmixed question of law
exception only applies where the question of law involves unrelated
subject matter. The Court held the action was brought by the same
manufacturers and associations, based on essentially the same facts,
challenging the same standard for the same reasons, alleging the same
harm, and seeking the same relief and, therefore, involves the same subject
matter. Consequently, the Court applied non-mutual, defensive collateral
estoppel.
The Court also rejected the public interest argument because the
Supreme Court has decreed issue preclusion to only be abrogated by a
public interest if it is applied to the government and where the question is
purely legal. For these reasons, the Rhode Island Court granted RIDEM's
motion for judgment on the pleadings in its favor.
As to the dealers, the Court denied RIDEM's motion for judgment on
the pleadings. RIDEM argued issue preclusion was applicable to the
dealers because they are in privity with the manufacturers and had been
virtually, or adequately, represented by the manufacturers and associations
in the previous cases. More specifically, RIDEM relies upon the
franchisee-franchisor relationship between the manufacturers and dealers
making the dealers' interests derivative of the manufacturers. The Court
found Supreme Court precedent rejected any virtual representation
argument and suggested the privity argument applies issue preclusion too
broadly. The Court found RIDEM failed to carry their burden of proof in
showing appropriate non-party preclusion requirements, such as the
formation of a substantive legal relationship by the franchisee-franchisor
relationship, the existence of adequate representation in the previous
cases, or the occurrence of the dealers as proxies for the manufacturers
and associations. Therefore, the Court denied RIDEM's motion for
judgment on the pleadings and held in favor of the dealers.
While the instant decision was decided upon procedural issues, its
significance is compelling in conjunction with the Vermont and California
cases. The promulgated, state regulations would impose stricter emission
standards on new automobiles than current federal regulation does.
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Consequently, any automobile sold in the states, which have adopted such
regulations, would be required to conform to them. So, manufacturers
would be left with two choices: produce all automobiles in conformance
with the regulations or produce two sets of automobiles, one set
conforming with the state regulations, and the other conforming with the
federal regulation. For efficiency's sake, the manufacturers would choose
the former. Therefore, the desires of only a few states for strict emission
standards would affect the emission standards of the entire Nation. Such a
result is of some concern because it is within the Federal government's
authority to regulate interstate commerce. A reason for that grant is to
facilitate and encourage interstate commerce without fear of differing laws
among the several states.
DAVID LAPEE
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